2018 SummerKnicks Wrap-Up

The SummerKnicks of the NBA’s Las Vegas Summer League finished with a record of 2-3. Obviously, the record by itself doesn’t tell us much. The real learning from Summer League is to be found in individual performances rather than aggregate stats, so let’s get to those.

Kevin Knox. You’d have to be cynical even for a Knicks fan not to be hopeful–maybe even a little giddy like Fran Fraschilla–about Knox’s performance in Vegas. We saw glimpses of him leading the break and initiating the screen roll both to score and create for others. These are things we really didn’t see at Kentucky. He was very committed to attacking the rim and getting to the FT line. He is going to be hard to guard for teams that aren’t committed to stopping him. (Boston was committed and leveraged him into difficult shots.) Knox had the greenest of green lights in Vegas leading him to throw up some bad shots here and there. So he was hardly a model of efficiency, though he hit a reasonable share of difficult shots. A bigger–if still mild–concern coming out of Summer League is that the jumper comes and goes. It’s a good looking shot, so it should be just a matter of time before it becomes a reliable weapon but how much time is anyone’s guess.

Mitchell Robinson. If you loved Knox in Vegas then you also have to love what Robinson put on display in every game. His rebounding and shot blocking should absolutely translate to the NBA. And good heavens, he covers so much ground. He blocked at least three jump shots on the perimeter that I can recall. Of course, like most young bigs he has no real idea how to establish defensive post position or rotate. Given all this, Robinson may represent a tough call for the brain trust. It wouldn’t surprise me at all if Fiz and Perry decide that it is best to let him mature in Westchester this entire upcoming season regardless of what he does in training camp or pre-season. Totally reasonable. Or, he could play his way into 15-20 rebounding, shot-blocking, slam-dunking minutes per night.

Frank Ntilikina.  Game 2 Frank was the best Frank, obviously.  But how he performed is just as important as how well. He pushed the ball up the floor, even on dead balls. He attacked the rim and unveiled a bit of Andre Miller to his game. That last part might be the most important development for his upcoming season. Ntilikina isn’t likely to be a classic penetrate-and-kick PG like Marbury but he can still break defenses down. Miller is the patron saint of putting a defender on his hip and taking him to the mid-post to pass or score. He did it on slow-paced teams and fast ones. Given Frank’s size, he needs some Dre in his game. Though plenty quick, he’s big enough to back down all but a few PGs. We needed to see that in summer league, along with a willingness to keep his dribble alive in traffic. We saw him do all these things across five quarters. (The first three quarters vs. ATL were ychhh.) I don’t subscribe to this being a so-called “make or break” season for Frank, I expect to see him carry this skill set into the regular season.

Damyean Dotson. The most disappointing summer league performance (relative to expectations) almost certainly belongs to Dotson. A second round flier who generally impressed when he got some run with the big club, he is hardly “the” key to the upcoming season. Still, a lot of people expect Courtney Lee to be moved this off-season. That mostly presumes that Dotson will contribute (if not start) as a 3-and-D wing. I’m not gonna go nuts over a few bad games. (And, he did play well in the final game.) But, Dotson was mostly awful on both ends of the floor against non-NBA talent for four straight games. He has training camp and pre-season to turn things around but he’s got  work to do. I’ll be rooting for him.

Allonzo Trier. The Knicks tried him at PG, when as far as I know he never even brought the ball up the floor at Arizona. And hoo brr-other, it did not go well. Jason Kidd he ain’t. But, he’s not a bad project on a two-way deal to play the bench scorer role. At 6’5″ he has nice size for SG so even if he never develops as an initiator he should contribute at his natural position. His college and summer numbers make it evident he can score reasonably efficiently. He was also the 3rd leading (per game) rebounder. 

Others. Apart from Kornet, the SummerKnicks really didn’t feature other NBA talent. Daniel Ofechu had some nice moments as a rebounding and passing PF. I have my doubts about whether he’s athletic enough to stay on the floor but he has an NBA skill set. On the other hand, I don’t really understand the team’s fascination with Isaiah Hicks.

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Knicks Draft 2018: Don’t Love Knox. Don’t Hate Him.

The first NBA draft for the Perry/Mills/Fizdale leadership team is in the books. So I’ll get right to the point, I don’t love Knox as a prospect but I certainly see what there is to love and I don’t know that there were much better options at #9. I never pronounce judgment the day after a draft unless I think the team did something dumb. They didn’t. Debatable? Certainly, but that’s to be expected. 

What I don’t like…

Though I doubt he’ll be some Anthony Bennett-level bust who just can’t play, Knox scares me a bit as a prospect. He’s actually not very good at anything just yet. To be fair, he’s always been young for his cohort. At just over 18 now, he’s the youngest or 2nd youngest player drafted this year. So he’s being sold as a high upside pick. That’s actually the part that scares me. As my homeboy Ty says, “greatness manifests early in basketball.” Yet, as ESPN’s Kevin Pelton notes (Insider), Knox has never really been great even in his cohort at AAU, USA Basketball, or at Kentucky. I’m not a big Trae Young fan, but even ignoring his shooting, he’s an elite playmaker in his cohort. Knox has been a decent-but-not-especially-efficient scorer who contributes less to the “effort” categories (rebounds/blocks/steals) than his athletic traits lead you to expect. He also doesn’t appear to be a playmaker of any note.

What I like…

I’m actually not here to crush our (Sharpei) puppy-faced prospect. Rather, I’m here to temper talk of his upside being Durant-like. (Thanks, Chauncey and others.) Unrealistic expectations doom prospects as much as anything else. If Knox really projected to be all-NBA or even consistent all-star caliber he’d probably already be elite at some aspect of the game, even at 18. (As Michael Beasley has said of Kevin Durant, “He had that jumper in the 6th grade.”) Over two seasons of EYBL and a freshman season as Kentucky’s leading scorer, he’s not proven to be even “very good” at any one aspect of the game. Nevertheless, the skills, the smooth athleticism, and a frame that can easily hold another 15 lbs. are all undeniable (especially given NY’s desperate need for more athleticism). I can’t blame anyone for feeling confident that production will soon follow. 

To my mind, a reasonable outcome for Knox is as a quality starter who functions mostly as a weakside scorer that puts the ball on the floor well enough to keep defenses honest. Assuming the shot comes around–his stroke looks legitimately great, so let’s call that likely–the open question is whether he’ll do enough other things to not offset his shooting. Given NY’s roster (and some potential culling), he could be starting consistently in his second season. I think his body probably fills out into a big 3/stretch 4, along the lines of Danillo Gallinari. If everything breaks right he could be better, but that’s more optimistic than realistic. 

In terms of process, the Knox selection is an easily defensible one given the way the board fell. I don’t see much fault on draft night. There were no dominating alternatives waiting for the Knicks at #9. Once Atlanta flipped Doncic to Dallas for Young I don’t think there was even a vaguely realistic trade-up scenario for NY. Add to that, you look at selections 10-15 and none of them is hands-down a better prospect than Knox. He was the last guy I feel comfortable projecting as a decent starter before a talent cliff. 

  • Mikal Bridges (PHI/traded): I am solidly on Team Mikal(TM) but his limitations are well known, even if I feel like his upside (especially on defense) has been criminally undersold.
  • Shai Gilgeous-Alexander (CHA/traded): Meh.
  • Miles Bridges (LAC/traded): He has his fans, me among them, but Knox cleaned his clock at the workout by all accounts. Certainly, if NY loved Miles he was available via trade.
  • Jerome Robinson (LAC): So, the Clippers ended up with two almost identically sized PGs?
  • Michael Porter, Jr. (DEN): I’m a Mizzou alum, and even I thought Michael Porter, Jr.’s risk profile wasn’t right for NY. It’s a legit great pick for Denver. Since they’re not going to defend at all they actually need another scorer. 
  • Troy Brown (WAS): I like Brown for them. They need bench talent so, so badly.

In the second round, NY selected Mitchell Robinson, something of a mystery man C who did not play college ball after committing to Western Kentucky. Again, given the way the board fell I have no problem with a gamble on his athletic traits. He’s 7’1″ in shoes with a 9’3″ standing reach and bouncy. It’s worth noting that his size and athleticism translated into production in the EYBL, where he rebounded and blocked his ass off. According to Pelton, he was dominant among his peers in those most translatable of box score categories. Among all EYBL players from 2012-16, Mitchell was 1st in block rate, 3rd in OREB%, and 1st in 2-pt. % (min. 150 FGAs). Yes please, and thank you. 

Evidently, NY has also signed former Arizona guard Allonzo Trier to a two-way contract. Though I’d have preferred Rawle Alkins, this is easily a worthwhile gamble.

Guardian: Cali Police and Prosecutors Cape for Neo Nazis & White Supremacists

The latest from the “Jeezus, what now?” file: The Guardian reports that police in Northern California have been caping hard for members of neo-Nazi/white nationalist groups, in some instances while in custody, in attempts to identify and target anti fascists for arrest.

A bit of background

California (and the West Coast generally) has been a major site of recent neo-Nazi and White supremacist mobilization. Meanwhile bands of loosely-connected anti fascists have actively countermobilized, leaving the two forces literally fighting in the streets. Heather Heyer’s murder in Charlottesville may have focused attention on right-wing violence but fatalities and serious injuries have been piling up for years, especially in California. To be clear, the open or tacit sanction of violence against women, people of color/immigrants, so-called race traitors and cucks, and political opponents generally is less a coherent strategy than an endemic feature of neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups. As sociologist Kathleen Blee notes in a 2017 essay on far-right mobilization (p. 5):

Chaos is not only a description of white supremacist membership; it is central to how many racial extremist groups operate… In the chaotic swirl of life in racist groups, ideas are sidelined by action and discussions by simple slogans. People are valued and accorded leadership roles for their aggression and willingness to take risks for the cause more than for their understanding of the cause… [T]hey are attracted by… coercion, fear, the lure of profit, opportunities to engage in violence, access to drugs or alcohol, ties of friendship, familial and sexual relationships, and links to criminal networks.

To be fair, Antifa is not bashful about engaging in and even instigating street-level violence but the willingness to go lethal with swords, guns, bombs, and driving into crowds of protesters is a hallmark of right wing groups. Certainly the publicly available body count, not to mention years of social science research, corroborate this.

A morality tale about policing

This Guardian story corroborates activists’ long-standing claim that local police have a wink-and-nod relationship with neo-Nazis and white supremacists. We can scream “NOT ALL OFFICERS!” about this all day long but to do so is to lose the plot (quite possibly on purpose). The central dilemma in this story is the moral rot that characterizes local policing’s historical origin and defining features. That rot didn’t get here because X percentage of officers lack personal integrity. Rather, it got here because there is no legitimate oversight of their practices. Even in the rare instances where they are brought to account for abuse, restitution comes from government; not police departments. Although it may be glib to claim that consent decrees and court decisions are toothless, it is perfectly accurate and fair to say that they largely do not impact practices on the ground like those highlighted in the Guardian article. 

So regardless of whether 1% or 99% of officers openly abet fascists or coyly turn a blind eye to their misdeeds, the practice itself does not violate any policy. And more importantly, even if it did there is no entity with the power, resources, and authority to enforce such a policy. (Many department heads lack even the authority to fire officers for getting drunk, doing drugs, or selling drugs while on duty.) Prosecutors may lose cases against Antifa activists built on fascist testimony but exoneration comes long after the targeting and arrest have already occurred. Meanwhile, it remains an open secret that white supremacists and other right-wing extremists have been infiltrating law enforcement for decades. Infiltrate might be too strong a term since many departments don’t even bother to scrutinize such affiliations in the hiring process. FBI reports from 2006 and 2015 make clear that this infiltration is national in scope, and not just a few fat Southern sheriffs reppin’ the ‘Stars and Bars.’ So when an officer in Northern California says to a neo-Nazi (in custody for beating up his wife), “We see YOU as the victim. Help us identify Antifa members,” the scandal is bigger than just his bias. We are way past that. The scandal is that no one in local law enforcement–not the officer or anyone else–can be held to account specifically for this practice. That level of moral rot cannot simply be cut out of local law enforcement. It is not an institution that can be saved or reformed. It has to be scrapped and re-imagined entirely. 

Why Being a Knicks Fan is the Worst (But This Time Might Be Different)

As you are no doubt aware, dear reader, Knicks phenom Kristaps Porzingis (aka the Unicorn) tore his ACL in a meaningless game on February 4th against the Milwaukee Bucks. The injury ends his 2017-18 season and almost certainly keeps him out of game action until after the calendar turns to 2019. This was, in its own way, a perfect microcosm of life as a Knicks fan. To that point in the contest, KP had more than held his own against Milwaukee’s uber-talented phenom, Giannis Antetokuonmpo. Porzingis blocked at least one of his dunk attempts and generally frustrated him. Of course, with Porzingis off the court the “Greek freak” went bananas

On the 2nd quarter play where Porzingis was injured he faked a high ball screen then quickly slipped it and cut to the rim, coming wide open to receive a perfect bounce pass for a dunk. Antetokuonmpo pursued but had little chance to contest the shot. Unfortunately, as Porzingis landed he appeared to catch just a wee bit of Antetokuonmpo’s foot with his own. He came down awkwardly and crumpled into a heap, clutching at his knee. With so little contact (it’s not even clear on video) a torn ACL seemed far less likely than an ankle sprain. Yet here we are.

Of course, Knicks fans are hardly alone in terms of suffering through life with an injured star. So when I say that the Porzingis injury is a microcosm of life as a Knicks fan, I’m not suggesting the Knicks have it worse than others. Rather, I’m referring to that foreboding sense that every Knicks fan feels; that the outcome will eventually be terrible no matter the cause. Now, it’s incompetent boobery often enough to warrant endless mocking from seemingly every ignorant jackass in the sports media universe. So at least dumb luck represents a kind of rhythm change. We usually have to wait all the way until the June draft lottery to get screwed by dumb luck. But here it is in early February, like Punxatawney Phil’s dismal shadow.

But y’know? This time feels a little different. To be clear, losing Porzingis is fetal-position-thumb-suck bad. I just feel more confident than in the past that this front office won’t make things worse with idiotic quick fixes. Y’know why? The Knicks are–gasp–not incompetently run. As much as it feels like tempting cruel fate to type those words, they are true as far as I can tell.  Although the possibility of a James Dolan “big time” move this summer hangs like the Sword of Damocles, he has (to date and to his credit) stayed disengaged from day-to-day management since firing Phil Jackson. The Mills/Perry duo (to date and to its credit) has stayed away from the kind of short-sighted, just-do-a-bigger-deal disasters that any Knicks fan can recite without thinking. Reasonable people can criticize their player evaluation (they clearly didn’t value Hernangomez), but turning McDermott (who they weren’t going to pay) into a cost-controlled look at a guard with size, athleticism, and some upside is not a bad look at all. 

And About All This Tanking

NBA tanking is always a popular topic. I don’t think the league cares about it quite as much as some fans, but it is a big deal. I am generally not opposed to tanking. A team may fairly conclude that it’s better off starting over than throwing good money after bad on a non-competitive roster. More importantly, I think the league is generally best off not dictating strategy to individual franchises.

With that as a caveat, I think the league has a duty to limit (not eliminate) tanking as a long-term strategy. Sam Hinkie’s infamous “The Process” is not good for the business of basketball, even if one might reasonably conclude that it was the best strategy for the Philadelphia 76ers. Hinkie’s strategy was built on economic theory. In essence, if one is allowed to lose a bet, but then bet double-or-nothing in perpetuity, he should continue betting until he wins. Hinkie applied this thinking to the draft. Keep betting (i.e., being bad enough to guarantee good odds of winning the draft lottery) until you win (i.e., land franchise-altering talent).

Although Hinkie is no villain–in fact, the Sixers appear to be improving–the league should be highly motivated to identify and limit perverse incentives to forego improvement. Bad franchises need to acquire young talent at the expense of winning, but they also have a duty to develop talent for long-term competitiveness. They shouldn’t be allowed to bet double-or-nothing in perpetuity without penalty.

As structured, The NBA’s draft lottery distributes the odds of getting the top pick too finely. There’s really no good reason that two teams whose records vary by a game or two should get different mathematical odds of having the chance to draft Tim Duncan (versus Keith Van Horn). Yet that’s what we have, and the consequence is perverse incentives to actively sabotage late-season games so as not to “lose ground” on other bad teams. This is not just “playing the kids.” I’m talking about benching a kid who is playing well in order to lose.

I would offer two basic reforms:

Reform 1: Tier the Ping Pong Balls

Rather than distribute ping pong balls weighted precisely by record, I would place the worst teams in the same tier and assign them all the same probability. There’s no real downside to this.

  • Tier I: Worst 5 records
  • Tier 2: Other lottery teams

The lottery would still feature names drawn at random, but here’s the kicker. I’d give the commissioner the power to expand Tier 1 to include 8 teams or 10 at his discretion. I’m all for go-nowhere teams developing young players at the expense of winning, but the point is to create conditions where a one or two game difference in record doesn’t change the odds of getting a good player. That should cut down on perverse incentives.

The Draft Should be a Hand-Up, Not A Way of Life…

The other change I’d implement is a three (consecutive) year limit on appearing in Tier 1 for each franchise, excluding traded picks. Again, you shouldn’t get to tank in perpetuity. So for example, if the Sixers were a Tier 1 team for three seasons they’d be in Tier 2 in the fourth (unless they made the playoffs). However, if they traded their pick to Portland the Blazers would get a Tier 1 pick if Philly finished with a bottom five record.

To be clear, I would not bar a team from winning the draft lottery for four consecutive seasons if the ping pong balls fell their way. Random chance would still be random. Rather, my intent is to limit tanking as a long-term talent acquisition strategy.

 

The NBA Could Use a Few Tweaks But So Could Fans

This “rest and scheduling” issue is the talk of the NBA right now. Powerful moneyed interests are feeling threatened and have responded in their usual way: like a 5 year old going limp in a grocery store checkout line. Still, if you can get through all the blubbering, hyperventilating, and slobber, they–and I’m talking national TV networks here–have an actual point. We know the economics. The big networks (esp. ESPN/ABC and TNT) pay the NBA for broadcast rights. They make their money by charging advertisers insane prices to peddle their wares to the nation. The prices are based on ratings, and the league’s broadcast model is heavily star-dependent.

Nevertheless, as ESPN’s Tom Haberstroh points out, the rest issue cannot be ‘bah! humbugged” away. A lot of the belly-aching about how lazy these millennial NBA stars are, and how their bodies really don’t need that much rest is rhetoric we can trace from the plantation to the plant floor, and safely ignore. The truth is that professional basketball is labor of the high repetitive stress variety. It may lack football’s explosive brutality, but it is hell on soft tissue, ligaments, and tendons.

So you can see the problem. When a star-driven broadcast model fails to deliver stars you best believe advertisers won’t keep paying premium prices. Revenue stability is of course in everybody’s long-term interests, but grinding up players’ bodies is not.

So, how to solve the issue? Well, I have one big thing and a few minor suggestions.

One big thing: NBA fans are just gonna have to learn to love the non-stars.

Basketball is improvisational art. As an NBA consumer, whether your taste is for Steve Kerr’s Warriors or Chuck Daley’s “Bad Boy” Pistons, aesthetics are a big part of what you are consuming. A game with Lebron James’ artistry is not the same product as one where he rests, even if the final score is identical. Yet artistic brilliance is a finite resource. To regularly produce it the artist needs time to recover. That’s just part of the deal.

But NBA fans in particular are spoiled rotten on this point, which is part of why the broadcast model has crept away from being star-driven to being star-obsessed in recent years. NBA fans are simply not habituated to times when their favorite players are not available. Baseball has its “getaway day” lineups on Sunday afternoons and its September call ups. In the NFL, the 30-carry RB is a thing of the past. Everybody has a “committee” now. Hell, in weeks 14-17 you don’t even know what you’re getting because teams are resting players.

Those fans don’t always like it, but they are generally habituated to players resting to treat or prevent injury. As a consequence they pay a fair bit of attention to non-stars and so-called role players. I’d wager that the typical NFL fan can tell you the backup tight end on his favorite team, because that guy plays regularly. The typical baseball fan knows the fourth outfielder (and probably at least one minor league prospect he’s never even seen). In sharp contrast, many, many NBA fans are so casual that they don’t even follow any particular team. They may know Russell Westbrook’s triple-doubling and James Harden’s beard, but they can’t name any other OKC or HOU starters (much less backups). I’m not saying this is most NBA fans, but way more than some insignificant portion, and far more than other sports.

THIS REST ISSUE CANNOT BE RESOLVED WITHOUT FIRST ACKNOWLEDGING THAT NBA FANS MUST CHANGE. I’m a marketing guy, and the marketing orientation is fundamentally about giving the people what they want. But, this is one of those moments where playing to the casual fan’s star-obsession is enabling a tragedy of the commons. Fans have to learn to want something else, or at least live with something else. Thing is, the league is so deep right now and the product is so good this shouldn’t be hard.

What the NBA can do.

  • Alter the schedule to accommodate regular season series play — This to me is low-hanging fruit. Teams should play 2-3 game series across non-consecutive nights in the same city to cut down on the insane every-road-game-in-a-different-city travel. You could see real benefits to player health before having to entertain cutting games. Teams already don’t play every other team. So if you lose a few inter-conference matchups each season, big whoop. You rotate inter-conference games by division like the NFL. Apart from cutting travel, it also cuts down on the complaint that “Lebron is only gonna be in city X once this season. Therefore, he must play.”
  • Play more 10-man rotations — Too many coaches are grinding star players down with 30+ minutes of high-intensity, high-stress basketball, in part because the league is so deep with athletes. It’s way past time to see more 10-man rotations. For all the talk of how playoff seeding doesn’t matter because one road win wrests home court advantage away, it’s amazing to me that more coaches don’t institute more minutes restrictions to get to the playoffs rested.
  • Expand rosters at the start and close of the regular season — Insert two call-up periods during the season for D-Leaguers and free agents, one pre-Christmas and one in March, where rosters expand to 16 players.
  • Promote teams AND stars — The NBA’s own marketing reinforces the “stars-and-scrubs” bias of its most casual fans. So, it is routine, for example, to see TNT/ESPN promos where the team names are never stated in the voiceover; only the names of stars. The NBA could be more diligent about having at least some product promos that mention teams and standings.

2016 Presidential Election: What The Hell Just Happened?

This quote tells you everything you need to know about what went wrong.

This summer when visiting my folks in St. Louis, I said, “I don’t think Trump can beat her, but she could lose. There’s a difference.” In the aftermath of what really ought to be the final death knell in the would-be Clinton political dynasty, this quote attributed to Chuck Schumer makes it plain to see how awful the political instincts of these Democratic centrists really are.

schumer-quote

Though it is possible that someone has misquoted Schumer, the sentiment expressed here was unmistakably at the heart of the Hillary Rodham Clinton (HRC) campaign. To be clear, it almost worked. Clinton got enough votes to win the popular, but lost the Electoral College based on Trump’s clean sweep of Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. She lost those states on a quixotic chase after so-called moderate Republicans, who would never, ever vote for her. I told my mom the Friday before the election that Trump had to win the tossup states and flip two that usually go blue to win. He did just that.

So, what happened?

Again. He really didn’t beat her. Her losing is the story.

As I see it, there’s two parts to this: (1) the votes Trump won; (2) the votes HRC didn’t. There is some overlap, but she mostly lost votes from people who opted out.

The alt-right racists and the “never-a-woman” crowd got Trump a lot of his vote totals. Based on the data I saw (and always take early exit polling with a huge grain of salt) he dominated on White voters. But for all the talk of blue-collar “angry White guy” revolt, Trump’s staunchest support came from the $50k-and-up small business owner types. One area you have to give him credit in is beating her with the White people who are the apple of her eye. To her credit, she did okay with less well off Whites.

Here’s the thing though. Trump’s level of support shouldn’t have been enough to win the White House. In fact, I actually wonder how far off the models were about his performance (if at all). The models didn’t think he would be impressive, and he wasn’t. As I understand it, he slightly underperformed McCain’s and Romney’s respective totals in 2008 and 2012. (Remember. Those two performances prompted all manner of “woe-is-me-soul-searching” among Republicans about whether they could ever win the White House again.) It’s hard to imagine ANY Republican nominee–Jeb, Rubio, Cruz, etc.–performing considerably worse than Trump just did.

Record low voter turnout is why she lost. In no way do I mean to minimize or discount sexism and racism or the weight of the faux-scandals in this election. But those factors mostly explain the votes that Trump got. They are less compelling explanations of the votes she didn’t get. The most compelling explanation for that is catastrophic strategic failure. Put it this way. In the waning days of the campaign, she was running ads featuring prominent Republican endorsers here in South Carolina. “Goldwater girl” to the last, I guess.

The Clinton team made it abundantly clear in the 2008 primaries that a 50 state door-to-door campaign to GOTV was old-fashioned. She would win, they said, with record-breaking fundraising and by sticking to the urban and suburban areas with high strategic value in the general election. They believed that right into 2016. HuffPo has a piece out today saying the HRC team relied on “small organizing,” which includes micro-targeting via text/direct, mail in lieu of traditional boots on the ground. Of course, all modern campaigns use micro-targeting. It’s an issue of emphasis.

When you put micro-targeting at the heart of your GOTV strategy you are running a low-turnout campaign. As Meredith Rolfe shows, candidates have a decent amount of say over whether an election has a “high” or “low” turnout in the aggregate. They control the presence of environmental cues that signal to people that others are (or are not) voting. It’s the lawn signs, the campaign buttons, the door-to-door canvassing, the buzz — all the stuff micro-targeted campaign messaging, by definition, does not provide.

The much disparaged Podesta emails also appear to show that the DNC (far too often in the role of surrogate, or at least inappropriately ardent supporter, of the HRC campaign) has spent considerable effort disciplining and de-funding the state and local party volunteers most responsible for mobilizing actual voters. If that is too conspiratorial for your taste I’ll put it another way. Republican voter suppression–an entirely predictable matter, given a gutted Voting Rights Act–worked in a number of states that Clinton needed, Wisconsin among them. The governor has declared open warfare on election-day registration and student voters. Surely, the GOTV efforts there were the most sophisticated given the level of Republican opposition. I mean, voter suppression in Wisconsin doesn’t even have to be framed as a race issue. Nope. As I understand it, Clinton never even campaigned in Wisconsin post-convention. That is face-to-palm, head shaking stuff. Evidently, the organizing principle of the campaign was that the corporate types in White Fish Bay and Appleton would more than offset any suppressed votes in Madison and Milwaukee.

Uh huh.

Whether through its callousness or incompetence (does it really matter which?) the Clinton campaign convinced scores of the party’s base voters that their votes didn’t matter. (Of course, the only ones the national talking heads give a rip about are blue-collar White guys.) Not shockingly, many stayed home. Her loss was not so much a matter of blue-collar White guys flipping to Trump. They picked him, not the other way around. As always for the Democrats, the loss really came down to who stayed home. Clinton needed a high turnout election by playing to the party’s base rather than to its power brokers. She got record low turnout and was running ads featuring Republican endorsers into the final week.